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INTRODUCTION
The American pharmaceutical market, a $300 billion industry,1 is currently
navigating a period of great uncertainty, with issues ranging from the unclear
impact of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act2 to the upcoming
expiration of numerous major patents3 to continued industry consolidation.4
All three factors are placing an enormous strain on pharmaceutical sales
representatives (“PSRs” or “Reps”), the heart of drugmakers’ sales efforts.5
Not long ago, these sales representatives, also known as detailers,6 owned
highly sought-after positions with salaries sometimes reaching six figures.7
The enviable base pay was only part of the story; these workers commonly
earned an additional twenty-five percent of their total compensation through
incentive-based bonuses.8 At its height, the PSR job market in the U.S.
comprised more than 100,000 workers.9 However, the field has shed more than
25,000 of those jobs since 2006 as the economy has contracted and
pharmaceutical giants have merged.10 Further, doctors have become more

1. Gary Gatyas, IMS Institute Reports U.S. Spending on Medicines Grew 2.3 Percent in
2010, to $307.4 Billion, IMS INSTITUTE FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS (April 19, 2011),
http://www.imshealth.com/portal/site/ims (follow “The IMS Institute” hyperlink; then follow
“Biopharma Forecasts & Trends” hyperlink; then follow “19 Apr 2011” hyperlink).
2. Arthur Daemmrich, U.S. Healthcare Reform and the Pharmaceutical Industry 22
(Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 12-015, 2011), available at http://www.hbs.edu/research/
pdf/12-015.pdf.
3. Barbara Martinez & Jacob Goldstein, Big Pharma Faces Grim Prognosis, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 6, 2007, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119689933952615133.html.
4. Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives: A Slowly Vanishing Breed?, INFOGROK
BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE NETWORKS (July 15, 2009) [hereinafter Vanishing], http://www.infog
rok.com/index.php/carousel/pharmaceutical-sales-representatives-a-slowly-vanishing-breed.html.
5. Id. (noting that experts point to continued industry consolidation as the largest reason the
PSR field has shrunk over the past five years).
6. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 387 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 132
S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
7. Amendola v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 558 F. Supp. 2d 459, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(although the plaintiff earned only $84,000 per year, her colleagues in more senior sales positions
earned more than $100,000 annually in base pay).
8. Elliot Scott, Pharmaceutical Sales Compensation: Past, Present and Future, TOWERS
WATSON (2010), http://www.towerswatson.com/assets/pdf/1404/WT_2010_15814.pdf (showing
more than half of the PSRs who visit primary care doctors receive a 75/25 compensation split,
and only four percent receive less than twenty percent of their salary through bonuses). Because
PSRs cannot sell drugs directly to doctors or patients, these bonuses instead are based on the
number of prescriptions of a Rep’s promoted drugs that are prescribed by physicians within a
Rep’s sales territory. Christopher, 635 F.3d at 387.
9. Jeanne Whalen, Drug Makers Replace Reps with Digital Tools, WALL ST. J., May 10,
2011, at B7, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703702004576268772
294316518.html.
10. Id.
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resistant to visits from sales representatives,11 a factor that has led drugmakers
to turn increasingly to e-detailing as an alternative to employing human Reps.12
PSRs did not leave their jobs quietly. Some joined class action lawsuits
against their former employers, claiming they were due unpaid overtime under
the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA” or the “Act”).13 The fight boiled down
to the definition of “sales” and its unique application to PSRs, who are
prevented by federal law from actually selling drugs.14 Because a
pharmaceutical company cannot make direct sales of its prescription drugs, its
sales force instead targets physicians as the necessary intermediary to reach the
products’ end users.15 PSRs do not sell the drugs directly to the doctors; they
can only promote the drugs, provide free samples, and sell doctors on the idea
of prescribing them.16 If these activities qualify as “sales” within the Act’s
definition, then PSRs meet the FLSA’s outside sales exemption requirements,17
rendering the employer exempt from paying them overtime wages.18 If the

11. Vanishing, supra note 4. Drug companies have lessened their dependence on sales
representatives as their work has faced greater pushback from physicians. Id. A survey found
twenty-three percent of doctors now totally refuse to see sales representatives, and a growing
number are requiring sales representatives to set appointments in order to see them. Ben Comer,
Docs Are Visited by 20 Reps a Week, Survey Says, MEDICAL MARKETING & MEDIA (Oct. 14,
2010), http://www.mmm-online.com/docs-are-visited-by-20-reps-a-week-survey-says/article/180
995.
12. Whalen, supra note 9, at B7; see also Amy Barrett, Pharmaceutical Companies Replace
Sales Reps with Websites, DAILYFINANCE (June 24, 2010, 3:20 PM), http://www.daily
finance.com/2010/06/24/pharmaceutical-companies-replace-sales-reps-with-websites (noting that
drugmakers such as AstraZeneca and Johnson & Johnson have begun using call centers and
online operations to provide samples and drug information to doctors).
13. See cases cited infra note 20. Companies are not allowed to retaliate against employees
for joining these lawsuits against them. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006).
Still, the fact that names of members of the plaintiff class are available on the federal court docket
likely has a chilling effect on current employees. Jim Edwards, Lay Us Off, Will You? Hundreds
Axed at Pfizer Sign Up for Overtime Lawsuit, CBS MONEYWATCH (June 13, 2011, 12:32 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123_162-42848716/lay-us-off-will-you-hundreds-axed-atpfizer-sign-up-for-overtime-lawsuit/?tag=bnetdomain.
14. See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2006). Prescription drugs cannot
be dispensed to their end users without the authorization of a “practitioner, other than a
pharmacist.” Id. § 829(b).
15. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 396 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d,
132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
16. See id.; see also Prescription Drug Marketing Act, 21 U.S.C. § 353(c)(1) (“No person
may sell, purchase, or trade or offer to sell, purchase, or trade any drug sample.”).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).
18. MARC LINDER, “MOMENTS ARE THE ELEMENTS OF PROFIT”: OVERTIME AND THE
DEREGULATION OF WORKING HOURS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 213 (2000)
(explaining the confusion over use of the term “exemption” in the Act by noting the legislation
was written from the employer’s viewpoint: “It is therefore the employer who is exempt—from
the burden of paying the minimum wage or mandatory overtime.”).
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workers do not make sales, then the exemption does not cover them, entitling
the Reps to overtime pay.19 The federal circuits split on the answer.20
The Second Circuit, in In re Novartis Wage and Hour Litigation, found
PSRs do not make sales, a decision that left the drugmaker open to an
estimated $100 million in liability for unpaid overtime to 2,500 sales
representatives.21 A few months later, in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp., the Ninth Circuit found PSRs do in fact qualify for the outside sales
exemption.22 After denying certiorari in Novartis, the Supreme Court granted it
in Christopher and affirmed that decision.23 Although the Court resolved the
split in a 5-4 decision that reached a common-sense result,24 the way it
achieved that result is troubling. Ruling that PSRs are not entitled to overtime
pay better meshes with the policy behind the Act’s exemptions, but the Court
could reach that result only through a loose interpretation of the statute’s terms,
an approach that is discouraged when interpreting remedial legislation.25 That
said, the dissent’s approach would not have been any better. Although its
analysis of the statutory text and regulations of the Secretary of Labor
(“Secretary”) made more sense, the result—that highly paid sales
representatives would be entitled to significant overtime pay as well—seems
mostly against the spirit and purpose of the exemption.26
This Note first will examine the FLSA’s statutory language, as well as the
Secretary’s interpretations of this language, while keeping the Act’s history
and rationale behind its exemptions in mind. Other recent applications of the

19. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).
20. Compare Christopher, 635 F.3d at 400–01 (finding PSRs meet the outside sales
exemption), with In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141, 155 (2d Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1568 (2011) (finding PSRs do not qualify under this exemption, so they must
be paid for overtime hours). For other cases that found PSRs fall under an FLSA exemption, see
Baum v. AstraZeneca LP, 605 F. Supp. 2d 669, 687 (W.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d, 372 F. App’x 246 (3d
Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 332 (2010); Schaefer-LaRose v. Eli Lilly & Co., 663 F. Supp.
2d 674, 700 (S.D. Ind. 2009), aff’d, 679 F.3d 560 (7th Cir. 2012); Barnick v. Wyeth, 522 F. Supp.
2d 1257, 1263–65 (C.D. Cal. 2007). For other cases ruling PSRs did not qualify under the outside
sales exemption, see Kuzinski v. Schering Corp., 384 F. App’x 17, 19 (2d Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1567 (2011); Jirak v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 716 F. Supp. 2d 740, 749 (N.D. Ill.
2010), rev’d sub nom, 679 F.3d 560 (7th Cir. 2012); Amendola v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 558
F. Supp. 2d 459, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Ruggeri v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 585 F.
Supp. 2d 308, 323 (D. Conn. 2008).
21. In re Novartis, 611 F.3d at 144, 155. In January 2012, the company reached a settlement
that would provide class members with up to $99 million. Chad Bray, Novartis Settles U.S.
Overtime Case, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (Jan. 25, 2012, 3:37 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10
001424052970203718504577183131865055056.html.
22. Christopher, 635 F.3d at 383, 400–01.
23. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2174 (2012).
24. See infra Part II.B.
25. See id.
26. See infra Part II.C.
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outside sales exemption will be addressed, and the Ninth Circuit’s Christopher
decision will be re-examined. Finally, the Supreme Court’s opinion will be
analyzed with the focus on whether PSRs plainly and unmistakably fall within
the statutory language for the outside sales exemption. The argument is that the
Court should have found that PSRs do not plainly and unmistakably fall within
the exemption’s terms, and thus, they are not exempt.27 This result runs counter
to what the Ninth Circuit considered “common sense,” but this problem’s ideal
solution should not have been found in the judicial branch.28 Instead, both the
legislature and the Department of Labor (“Department” or “DOL”) were better
positioned to create a solution remaining true to both the terms and spirit of the
Act.29
I. BACKGROUND
A.

Contours of the FLSA
1.

The Act’s History and Rationale

The 1930s saw a wave of labor legislation, and numerous statutes and
industry codes that directly preceded the FLSA capped the number of hours
certain employees could work.30 Providing overtime pay for additional hours
was primarily a secondary issue.31 The top priority of these initiatives was to
fight the staggering unemployment of the Great Depression.32 Congress
showed a similar intent when it passed the FLSA in 1938. The Act’s stated
purpose was to promote the “health, efficiency, and general well-being of
workers” by creating minimum standards for employers.33 Further evidence
that Congress intended the Act mainly to combat unemployment by spreading
work can be found in the legislative record.34

27. See infra Part II.B.
28. See infra Part III.
29. See infra Part III.A–B.
30. LINDER, supra note 18, at 37–39 (noting the President’s Reemployment Agreement of
1933 helped prompt a variety of industry codes that limited workers’ hours).
31. Id. Guaranteeing overtime pay was not a direct goal of these industry codes; rather, it
was an indirect consequence to the codes’ exceptions for work hour limits. Id. Most of these
codes provided for additional compensation, usually at the rate of time and a half, for instances
when an employee’s workweek was allowed to be extended past the prescribed limit. Id.
32. Robert VanGiezen & Albert F. Schwenk, Compensation From Before World War I
Through the Great Depression, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (2003). U.S. unemployment
rates peaked at twenty-five percent in 1933.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a).
34. While debating the Act, Senator Alben Barkley said, “I believe it will be socially,
economically, and industrially more wholesome and safe for all the available labor in America to
be able to work three-fourths of the time than for three-fourths of it to work all the time and onefourth never to work.” LINDER, supra note 18, at 43 (quoting 81 CONG. REC. 7941 (1937)). After
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The key components of the Act created a standard forty-hour work week,35
and employees who worked beyond that limit were entitled to extra
compensation in the form of time-and-a-half overtime payment.36 Although
this provision, viewed from our twenty-first century perspective, seems clearly
aimed at rewarding hard workers, the expected result at the time was for work
to be spread to the unemployed as employers sought to avoid paying the
overtime rate.37
The Act includes numerous exceptions,38 including ones for certain whitecollar workers who are exempted from overtime pay.39 In Section 13(a)(1), the
Act specifically excludes “any employee employed in a bona fide executive,
administrative, or professional capacity . . . or in the capacity of outside
salesman (as such terms are defined and delimited from time to time by
regulations of the Secretary [of Labor]).”40
Outside salesmen were excluded from overtime pay because their work
went largely unsupervised.41 This freedom made it difficult for employers to
control the number of hours the salesmen worked, so it made little sense to
compensate these employees on an hourly basis.42 Further, salesmen usually
earned commissions for their sales, which would compensate them in lieu of
overtime.43 In fact, the Secretary recently noted that the administrative and
outside sales exceptions were carved out under the rationale that white-collar
workers already were paid well above the minimum wage.44 These workers

an amendment was suggested that would require employers to also pay time and a half for
graveyard shift workers, the chair of the House Labor Committee noted: “[I]f we could do this it
would do more to spread employment than any other thing concerned in the bill. That is the
purpose of the bill—to try to spread employment.” LINDER, supra note 18, at 43 (quoting 82
CONG. REC. 1696 (1937) (statement of Rep. Mary Norton)).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). Actually, the Act created a forty-four hour week for the first year it
was in effect, followed by a decline to forty-two hours in its second year. Id. Today’s standard
forty-hour work week began in the third year after the Act’s passage. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Overnight Motor Transp. Co., Inc. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 577–78 (1942) (finding
that the intent of the Act was not solely to boost substandard wages, but also to apply financial
pressure on businesses to “spread employment to avoid the extra wage”).
38. LINDER, supra note 18, at xvii (calling the Act “profoundly flawed” because of “an
enormous number of exclusions and exemptions”).
39. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).
40. Id.
41. Jewel Tea Co. v. Williams, 118 F.2d 202, 207–08 (10th Cir. 1941).
42. Id. (explaining that an outside salesman “can earn as much or as little, within the range
of his ability, as his ambition dictates”).
43. Id.
44. Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional,
Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,122, 22,123–24 (Apr. 23, 2004) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541).
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also frequently received more fringe benefits due to their positions.45 The
Secretary further explained:
[T]he type of work [white-collar workers] performed was difficult to
standardize to any time frame and could not be easily spread to other workers
after 40 hours in a week, making compliance with the overtime provisions
difficult and generally precluding the potential job expansion intended by the
46
FLSA’s time-and-a-half overtime premium.

2.

The Secretary’s Definitions and Delimitations

Congress did not define the white-collar exemption terms and instead
explicitly left that job to the Secretary.47 In Auer v. Robbins, the Supreme
Court recognized the Secretary’s “broad authority to ‘defin[e] and delimi[t]’
the scope of the exemption for executive, administrative, and professional
employees.”48 Under the Secretary’s published regulation, “outside salesman”
is defined as an employee:
(1) Whose primary duty is: (i) making sales within the meaning of section 3(k)
of the Act, or (ii) obtaining orders or contracts for services or for the use of
facilities for which a consideration will be paid by the client or customer; and
(2) Who is customarily and regularly engaged away from the employer’s place
49
or places of business in performing such primary duty.

“Primary duty” is defined as “the principal, main, major or most important
duty that the employee performs.”50
Section 3(k) of the FLSA explains that “‘[s]ale’ or ‘sell’ includes any sale,
exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other
disposition.”51 The Secretary’s regulations provide:
Sales within the meaning of section 3(k) of the Act include the transfer of title
to tangible property, and in certain cases, of tangible and valuable evidences of
intangible property. Section 3(k) of the Act states that ‘sale’ or ‘sell’ includes

45. Id. at 22,124.
46. Id.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).
48. 519 U.S. 452, 456 (1997). Although the Court in Auer did not expressly address the
outside sales exemption, there should be no doubt that the Secretary’s authority to define terms
extends to that exemption as well since the statutory phrase “as such terms are defined and
delimited” immediately follows the outside sales portion of the exemption.
49. 29 C.F.R. § 541.500(a)(1) (2011). This note does not address the requirement to be
“regularly engaged” away from the employer’s place of business because that issue is not in
dispute for PSRs, who spend the majority of their workdays visiting doctors. Likewise, there is no
argument about the inapplicability of the “placing orders” prong, since PSRs do not take drug
orders from doctors. The entire issue centers on the first part: whether PSRs make sales within the
statutory definition. See supra notes 14–20 and accompanying text.
50. 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 203(k).
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any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or
52
other disposition.

In 2004, the Secretary released further guidance on what an employer must
do to show an employee falls under one of the FLSA’s white-collar
exemptions.53 Those guidelines note that “[a]n employer cannot meet this
requirement unless it demonstrates objectively that the employee, in some
sense, has made sales.”54 “Employees have a primary duty of making sales if
they ‘obtain a commitment to buy’ from the customer and are credited with the
sale.”55 Thus, sales and promotional work are differentiated under the
regulations. The regulation explains that people who make sales also
commonly perform promotional work, but whether that promotional work is
exempt depends on whether it is performed “incidental to and in conjunction
with an employee’s own outside sales.”56 If the promotional work is incidental
to sales made by someone else, it is not exempt.57 Further, the Secretary’s 2004
guidance emphasized that the Department did not “intend to change any of the
essential elements required for the outside sales exemption.”58 To qualify, the
“employee’s primary duty must be to make sales . . . . Extending the outside
sales exemption to include all promotion work, whether or not connected to an
employee’s own sales, would contradict this primary duty test.”59
Because the FLSA is remedial legislation,60 its language should be
construed liberally to advance its purpose:61 spreading labor to protect workers
“unable to protect themselves from excessively low wages and excessively

52. 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b).
53. Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions, 69 Fed. Reg. at 22,122.
54. Id. at 22,162 (distinguishing sales from pure promotional work).
55. Id. at 22,162–63 (citation omitted) (“In borderline cases the test is whether the person is
actually engaged in activities directed toward the consummation of his own sales, at least to the
extent of obtaining a commitment to buy from the person to whom he is selling. If his efforts are
directed toward stimulating the sales of his company generally rather than the consummation of
his own specific sales his activities are not exempt.”).
56. 29 C.F.R. § 541.503(a) (emphasis added).
57. Id.
58. Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions, 69 Fed. Reg. at 22,162.
59. Id.
60. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944)
(“[T]hese provisions, like the other portions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, are remedial and
humanitarian in purpose. We are not here dealing with mere chattels or articles of trade but with
the rights of those who toil, of those who sacrifice a full measure of their freedom and talents to
the use and profit of others. Those are the rights that Congress has specially legislated to
protect.”).
61. Id. (“Such a statute must not be interpreted or applied in a narrow, grudging manner.”);
see also Ne. Marine Terminal Co., Inc. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 268 (1977) (broadly defining
“employee” because it found clear legislative intent in the amendment to protect longshoremen).
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long hours.”62 Likewise, exceptions within remedial legislation should be
construed narrowly in order to achieve their legislative purpose.63 Thus, the
FLSA’s outside sales exemption should be narrowly construed against the
employer seeking to assert it.64 The exemption applies only to employees
“plainly and unmistakably within [the] terms and spirit” of the exemption.65
Further, the employer bears the burden to prove the employee does in fact
qualify for an exemption.66
B.

Interpreting the Provisions

Statutory interpretation always begins by examining the text,67 and
statutory language is to be followed when clear.68 However, when statutory
language is ambiguous, an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers
may be entitled to deference.69 This Auer deference is given so long as the
agency’s interpretation is “based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”70 Likewise, an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous
regulation receives deference unless “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
62. LINDER, supra note 18, at 48 (quoting “Message from the President,” in 82 CONG. REC.
9, 11 (1937)).
63. Brennan v. Keyser, 507 F.2d 472, 477 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding a towing company did not
fall clearly within both the terms and spirit of the FLSA’s exemption for retail or service
establishments).
64. Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 394 n.11; see also Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 391
(9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
67. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1557
(1998) (“The plain meaning of a text as applied to a set of facts is the focal point for attention,
whether one is a textualist, intentionalist, or pragmatic interpreter of statutes.”).
68. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)
(“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”).
69. Id. at 843–44. The rationale behind agency deference boils down to two concepts:
competence and delegation. Melanie E. Walker, Comment, Congressional Intent and Deference
to Agency Interpretations of Regulations, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1341, 1341 (1999). The first point
rests on the contention that an agency has greater expertise of the subject matter it covers, which
should make it more competent than a court to clarify the ambiguous language. Id. The second
point flows out of the belief that if Congress did not expressly address an issue, it left the power
to the appropriate agency to handle those details. Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44) (“If
Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority
to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.”).
70. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–44 (deciding to defer to the agency interpretation of an
ambiguous statute); see also Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State,
133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 569 (1985) (“[C]ourts do not necessarily abdicate a Marshallian duty to
‘say what the law is’ by deferring to agencies. Courts retain the authority to control administrative
abuses of power; deferential review simply recasts the question of ‘law’ as whether the agency’s
interpretation is ‘reasonable.’”).
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regulation.”71 The interpretation need not be the only one possible, nor does it
need to be the conclusion the court would have reached if the question had
originated there without any agency interpretation.72 The court serves as an
“important check on the agency’s decisionmaking [sic] process, but ultimately
the agency’s judgment, if reasonable, must prevail.”73 Still, unchecked
deference to agency decisions could foster political conflict as an agency might
attempt to change an interpretation created under a previous administration.74
Although courts interpreting the FLSA should narrowly construe its
exemptions against the employer, the Secretary has no such limitation and is
bound solely by the statutory language.75 The fact that an agency’s
interpretation is provided in a legal brief rather than a federal rule does not
necessarily make it unworthy of deference,76 although this interpretation may

71. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (citation omitted) (finding the Secretary’s
interpretation, given in an amicus brief, was controlling).
72. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.11.
73. Brodsky v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 578 F.3d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 2009).
74. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J.
1083, 1180 (2008) (noting that agency decisions “sometimes reflect a partisan perspective”). For
instance, the Department of Labor’s interpretation of the definition of “clothes” has changed
twice in the past decade. Under the FLSA, time spent “changing clothes or washing at the
beginning or end of each workday” is not compensable time and would not be factored into
measuring a worker’s hours. 29 U.S.C. § 203(o). In 1997, under a Democratic administration, the
Secretary issued an opinion letter explaining that the “plain meaning” of “clothes” did not include
protective equipment, so workers would be compensated for their time putting on and taking off
this work equipment. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR WAGE & HOUR DIV., ADMINISTRATOR’S
INTERPRETATION NO. 2010-2, 1 (2010). In 2002, under a Republican administration, the new
Secretary issued an opinion letter stating that protective equipment should be considered
“clothes,” so employees would not be compensated for this time. See WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR OPINION LETTER, FLSA2002-2, 3 (2002). In 2010, the
Department of Labor, under a Democratic administration again, reversed course and reaffirmed
the 1997 interpretation that “clothes” are different from protective equipment required by law, the
employer, or the nature of the job. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR WAGE & HOUR DIV.,
ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO. 2010-2, 1 (2010). That document noted the fact that the
majority of courts that had addressed the issue since the 2002 letter had rejected its interpretation,
including the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at 1–2.
75. Auer, 519 U.S. at 463 (“A rule requiring the Secretary to construe his own regulations
narrowly would make little sense, since he is free to write the regulations as broadly as he wishes,
subject only to the limits imposed by the statute.”).
76. Id. at 462 (differentiating between a brief providing an interpretation that reflects the
agency’s “fair and considered judgment” and one that is merely a “post hoc rationalization” in
which an agency attempts to defend its past action); see also Bigelow v. Dep’t of Def., 217 F.3d
875, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting that Auer deference does not even require an agency “to
demonstrate affirmatively that its interpretation represents its fair and considered judgment”).
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encounter greater scrutiny if the agency is a party to the lawsuit.77 The
Supreme Court also has found that an agency’s interpretation is not owed
deference when “instead of using its expertise and experience to formulate a
regulation, it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language.”78 This
result logically flows from the concept that an agency’s interpretation is
unnecessary when statutory language is clear, so the interpretation will be used
only when the statute is unclear.79 Merely repeating the language of an unclear
statute does nothing to illuminate its intended meaning.
C. Other Outside Sales Cases
The reasoning that courts have employed in other outside sales cases, both
outside and within the pharmaceutical industry, can shed light on the PSRs’
situation. The best place to start is Jewel Tea Co. v. Williams, which the Ninth
Circuit considered the “paradigm” outside sales case.80 The employees in
Jewel Tea were “route salesmen” who distributed tea and coffee products to
customers, while they also took orders for future deliveries.81 They claimed to
be merely “delivery men” who should be paid overtime, but the court found
them exempt because their work was “chiefly devoted to effect sales.”82 They
spent more time “devoted to salesmanship” than to delivering the goods, and in
addition, the men received commissions for their sales and were selected for
their ability as salesmen.83
In determining whether a “sale” is present, some recent decisions focused
on the employee’s ability, or lack thereof, to close a sale.84 For those courts, no
commitment meant no sale.85 Others looked past this inability and focused

77. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988) (“Deference to what
appears to be nothing more than an agency’s convenient litigating position would be entirely
inappropriate.”); Robinson Knife Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Comm’r, 600 F.3d 121, 134 n.11 (2d Cir.
2010) (refusing to apply Auer deference to the interpretation of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue when the Commissioner was a party to the lawsuit).
78. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 244, 257 (2006) (deciding not to defer to the
Attorney General’s Interpretive Rule when its language was the “near equivalen[t]” of the
statute); see also N. Cal. River Watch v. Wilcox, 620 F.3d 1075, 1088 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding the
disputed rules “essentially parrot” the statute’s language).
79. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
80. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 397 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 132
S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
81. Jewel Tea Co. v. Williams, 118 F.2d 202, 203 (10th Cir. 1941).
82. Id. at 208.
83. Id.
84. See Clements v. Serco, Inc., 530 F.3d 1224, 1227 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding that military
recruiters who “sold” the idea of enlisting were not outside salespeople because they could not
“close the sale”).
85. Id. at 1227, 1228–29 (explaining that the touchstone for making a sale is “obtaining a
commitment”).
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more on the end result.86 For instance, a marketing director at a title company
merely referred customers to her employer.87 That court, however, emphasized
the fact that she was still the one credited with the sale, and no further sales
efforts were necessary after her interaction with customers.88 In addition, the
court noted that the employee was hired for her sales experience, and her
compensation was entirely connected to how many orders she provided.89
Of the dozens of PSR cases, Novartis likely provides the best background
to understand Christopher. The Novartis Reps, like those at any
pharmaceutical company, could provide doctors with free samples and drug
information,90 but they were prevented from selling prescription drugs, either
to the public or to physicians.91 Since they could not sell drugs, the Reps could
receive, at most, a non-binding commitment from doctors to prescribe a drug,
and there was no way to see whether the doctors followed through on that
commitment.92 The Novartis Reps’ incentives were based on the number of
prescriptions of their drugs filled within a representative’s territory.93 Each of
the Reps earned at least $455 per week in base pay.94 Some earned more than
$100,000 annually, and the average total compensation in 2005 was $91,539.95
The Reps’ workdays consisted of being in the field from eight a.m. to five
86. See Gregory v. First Title of Am., Inc., 555 F.3d 1300, 1301, 1310 (11th Cir. 2009)
(finding the employee made sales under the exemption by obtaining orders for services).
87. Id. at 1301.
88. Id. at 1309.
89. Id.
90. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141, 144 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 1568 (2011).
91. Id.; see also 21 U.S.C. § 353(c)(1).
92. In re Novartis, 611 F.3d at 145.
93. Id. at 146. This calculation required some estimation because not all pharmacies
participate with the reporting services that track this information for the pharmaceutical
companies. Id. For example, Novartis received data covering only about seventy-two percent of
sales and extrapolated from there. Id.
94. Id. This figure has no effect on whether the outside sales exemption would apply. See 29
C.F.R. § 541.500(c) (explaining that the salary requirements for other exemptions in this section
do not apply to outside sales employees). The $455 level is important, however, for the other
FLSA exemptions. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.100(a)(1) (setting $455 per week as the baseline for an
employee to qualify under the executive exemption); 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)(1) (setting the same
level for the administrative exemption); 29 C.F.R. § 541.300(a)(1) (setting the same level for the
professional exemption).
95. In re Novartis, 611 F.3d at 146. The $100,000 level is relevant because it could allow an
otherwise non-exempt employee to be exempt. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.601(a). Under that section, an
employee with at least $100,000 in total annual compensation who “customarily and regularly
performs any one or more of the exempt duties” required under the executive, administrative, or
professional exemptions would be exempt from overtime pay. Id. Further, the regulation comes
close to setting a presumption that an employee compensated at that level is exempt. See id. §
541.601(c) (“A high level of compensation is a strong indicator of an employee’s exempt status,
thus eliminating the need for a detailed analysis of the employee’s job duties.”).
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p.m., and they also occasionally attended mandatory dinner events that would
last until nine or ten p.m.96
The trial court in Novartis decided that excluding the Reps from exemption
would “ignore[] the Act’s spirit, purpose, and goals.”97 It reasoned that “Reps
make sales in the sense that sales are made in the pharmaceutical industry.”98
The appellate court, after receiving the Secretary’s amicus brief, reversed the
decision and deferred to the agency’s interpretation that the Reps were not
exempt.99 The court found the interpretation was consistent with the
regulations because someone who “merely promotes a product that will be sold
by another person does not, in any sense intended by the regulations, make the
sale.”100 The court also found the interpretation was not erroneous: “[a]lthough
the phrase ‘other disposition’ is a catch-all [sic] that could have an expansive
connotation, we see no error in the regulations’ requirement that any such
‘other disposition’ be ‘in some sense a sale.’”101 The court further found the
interpretation consistent with the call to narrowly construe exemptions to
remedial statutes.102 Whereas other courts had been willing to declare a
doctor’s commitment to prescribe sufficient to constitute a sale, the Second
Circuit in Novartis emphasized that the Secretary’s 2004 guidelines required
not just any commitment, but a “commitment to buy.”103 PSRs do not receive
such a commitment; instead, the best they can hope for is a non-binding
commitment to prescribe.104 The court summarized:
[W]here the employee promotes a pharmaceutical product to a physician but
can transfer to the physician nothing more than free samples and cannot
lawfully transfer ownership of any quantity of the drug in exchange for
anything of value, cannot lawfully take an order for its purchase, and cannot
lawfully even obtain from the physician a binding commitment to prescribe it,
we conclude that it is not plainly erroneous to conclude that the employee has
not in any sense, within the meaning of the statute or the regulations, made a
105
sale.

96. In re Novartis, 611 F.3d at 146.
97. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 593 F. Supp. 2d 637, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), rev’d,
611 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1568 (2011).
98. In re Novartis, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 650.
99. In re Novartis, 611 F.3d at 149.
100. Id. at 153.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 154 (emphasis omitted) (citing Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions, 69 Fed.
Reg. at 22,162–63.
104. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141, 154 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 1568 (2011).
105. Id.
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D. Christopher’s Outside Sales Application
1.

The Ninth Circuit’s Approach

The Ninth Circuit saw things differently in Christopher despite the fact
that the Glaxo (SmithKline) PSRs encountered comparable duties and
limitations.106 When visiting doctors, the Glaxo PSRs provided product
information and drug samples for a specific “drug bag” of medications, and
they answered questions about the products.107 The PSRs could not sell
samples, nor could they take drug orders or negotiate contracts with
physicians.108 The representatives worked mostly outside the office and often
worked an additional ten to twenty hours each week outside normal business
hours.109 When hiring PSRs, the company sought applicants with previous
sales experience.110 Glaxo aimed for an ideal compensation breakdown that
would provide seventy-five percent of a PSR’s compensation in salary, with
the other twenty-five percent based on incentives.111 These incentives were
calculated by increases in market share, sales volume, sales revenue, and dose
volume for products within a PSR’s territory.112 Based on these facts, the Ninth
Circuit determined the PSRs qualified as outside salespeople, making them
ineligible for overtime pay.113
Reaching this conclusion required the court first to decide it need not defer
to the Secretary’s interpretation. It relied on Gonzales v. Oregon to determine
that an agency is not owed deference when its interpretation merely
paraphrases statutory language, since the agency would not be using any
expertise to interpret the statute.114 The Ninth Circuit found that to be the case
here.115 The court said the Secretary’s regulation provided no additional
guidance, such as factors or a test to help determine whether a “sale” is

106. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 387–88 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d,
132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012) (noting that PSRs’ work generally was the same throughout the industry
and had changed very little over the previous sixty years).
107. Christopher, 635 F.3d at 386. The defendant corporation does business as
GlaxoSmithKline, so the Christopher court routinely referred to the employer as Glaxo.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 387.
112. Christopher, 635 F.3d at 387.
113. Id. at 400–01.
114. Id. at 393 (quoting Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (“An agency does not
acquire special authority to interpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise and
experience to formulate a regulation, it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory
language.”)).
115. Id. at 395 (“The failure to add specificity to the statutory scheme that troubled the
Gonzales Court, indeed the ‘parroting’ of statutory language, is present in the Secretary’s outside
sales regulations.”).
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present, and it merely directed employers back to the statute.116 The court
reasoned it could not give Auer deference to such an interpretation.117
Once it decided not to defer to the Secretary’s interpretation, the Ninth
Circuit was free to interpret the language itself, and it concluded that PSRs “in
some sense make a sale.”118 The court relied on the Act’s inclusion of “other
disposition[s]” to find the definition covered PSR activities.119 Although other
courts had avoided this result because doctors’ commitments to prescribe drugs
are non-binding,120 the Ninth Circuit found it irrelevant that the doctors are not
legally bound.121 It determined that the transaction still amounted to a
“meaningful exchange” between the Reps and doctors, and this exchange was
enough to treat it as a transaction covered by the statute.122
Although the FLSA is to be narrowly construed against the employer, the
court sidestepped this hurdle by declaring that the “general principle does not

116. Id. at 394–95 (“A definition dependent almost entirely on Congress’s seventy-two-year
old statutory language is not an example of the DOL employing its ‘expertise’ to elucidate
meaning to which we owe Auer deference.”).
117. Christopher, 635 F.3d at 395 (“Given the admonition in Gonzales, we are unable to
accord Auer deference to a regulation written in this manner . . . . Were we to accept the
Secretary’s offer, and give controlling deference even where there exists no meaningful
regulatory language to interpret, we would unduly expand Auer’s [sic] applicability to
interpretations of statutes expressed for the first time in case-by-case amicus filings.”).
118. Id. at 395–96 (citing Defining the Exemptions, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,122, 22,122 (Apr. 23,
2004) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541)).
119. Id. at 395 (citing Steven I. Locke, The Fair Labor Standards Acts Exemptions and the
Pharmaceuticals Industry: Are Sales Representatives Entitled to Overtime?, 13 BARRY L. REV. 1,
25 (2009) (“Applying these [common-usage] definitions, it is logical to conclude that the term
‘other disposition,’ as it is used to define a ‘sale’ under the Act, includes a physician’s decision to
write a prescription for a particular medication.”)).
120. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141, 154 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 1568 (2011) (emphasizing that the commitment required is one “to buy,” not a non-binding
commitment to prescribe); Ruggeri v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 585 F. Supp. 2d 308,
322 (D. Conn. 2008) (finding no commitment because PSRs did not take orders from doctors);
Amendola v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 558 F. Supp. 2d 459, 464 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(wondering what a commitment would entail since doctors remain free to prescribe any
medication they think will help an individual patient).
121. Christopher, 635 F.3d at 396; see also Schaefer-LaRose v. Eli Lilly & Co., 663 F. Supp.
2d 674, 686 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (“[T]o the extent that sales are made in the pharmaceutical industry,
Ms. Schaefer-LaRose made sales whenever she received commitments from physicians to
prescribe Lilly drugs.”).
122. Christopher, 635 F.3d at 396 (quoting Baum v. AstraZeneca LP, 605 F. Supp. 2d 669,
681 (W.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d on other grounds, 372 F. App’x 246 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
332 (U.S. 2010) (“This Court believes that other courts, and perhaps regulatory agencies,
underestimate the significance of this oral commitment from physicians . . . . Sometimes lawyers
and judges forget that a person’s word means something; remarkably, many people do not
actually need a 400-page contract to bind themselves to their word.”)).
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mean that every word must be given a rigid, formalistic interpretation.”123 The
court considered its interpretative approach to be commonsensical,124 and it
found the rationale for using the exemption as “apparent” as it was in Jewel
Tea.125
2.

The Supreme Court’s Conservative Majority Agrees

Before interpreting the provisions, the Court had to decide not to defer to
the agency’s interpretation. The majority opinion listed a number of reasons
for finding Auer deference unwarranted. For one, although the Department of
Labor’s conclusion had remained the same since 2009, its reasoning had
changed after the Court granted certiorari.126 In addition, the Court found no
“fair warning,” given that the interpretation would impose massive liability on
Glaxo for conduct that had occurred before the agency’s interpretation had
been advanced.127 The majority found it particularly noteworthy that for
decades the Department never initiated any enforcement related to detailers’
lack of overtime pay.128 It emphasized that although it is possible an entire
industry could escape the agency’s notice for a long time, it is much more
plausible that the activity was never considered unlawful.129 The majority
determined that “[o]ther than acquiescence, no explanation for the DOL’s
inaction is plausible.”130
The majority examined the Department’s interpretation with fresh eyes and
found it “quite unpersuasive.”131 The agency’s brief for the Court argued that
its sales regulation, § 541.501(b), required a transfer of title in order to have a
“sale,” but the Court found no such requirement.132 A consignment for sale
includes no transfer of title, but it is clearly included in the “sale” definition.133
The Court concluded that the regulation merely notes that a transaction
involving a transfer of title would be included in a “sale,” not that it is

123. Christopher, 635 F.3d at 397.
124. Id. at 395–96.
125. Id. at 398 (quoting Jewel Tea Co. v. Williams, 118 F.2d 202, 208 (10th Cir. 1941) (“To
apply hourly standards primarily devised for an employee on a fixed hourly wage is incompatible
with the individual character of the work of an outside salesman.”).
126. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2165–66 (2012).
127. Id. at 2168 (“It is one thing to expect regulated parties to conform their conduct to an
agency’s interpretations once the agency announces them; it is quite another to require regulated
parties to divine the agency’s interpretations in advance or else be held liable when the agency
announces its interpretations for the first time in an enforcement proceeding and demands
deference.”).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2169.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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necessary for a sale.134 The Department suggested that the Court could look
past that regulation and focus instead on its promotional work regulation, §
541.503(a).135 The Court found that regulation’s interpretation depended
almost entirely on the “flawed” transfer-of-title reasoning.136 These
determinations left the Court free to perform its own independent interpretation
of the FLSA.
In examining the Act’s text, the majority emphasized the part of the
definition that looks for people employed “in the capacity of” outside
salesmen, and it reasoned that this language favored a functional rather than
formal inquiry.137 The federal regulation provided other textual clues,
including use of the word “includes” rather than “means.”138 The language
choice significantly hinted at a non-exhaustive list, particularly since the Act
used “means” in other instances in order to limit lists to the items enumerated
within them.139 The majority found the word “any” was best read as “one or
some indiscriminately of whatever kind,” since the Act included both sales and
transactions that would not technically be sales, such as exchanges or
consignments to sell.140 The final textual clue was one the Ninth Circuit
advanced: the inclusion of “other disposition” as a catchall.141 Although the
majority said it agreed that the rule of ejusdem generis142 should be applied, it
found the Department’s interpretation of “other disposition” too narrow.143 If
the phrase was meant to include only “contract[s] for the exchange of goods or
services in return for value,” as the Department argued, then there would be
nothing caught by this term that had not already been covered by other terms in
the list.144 Instead, the majority took a functional reading of this term to allow
industry-by-industry variations.145 It found no requirement for a narrower
construction and argued away Arnold by saying it was inappropriate where the
interpretation was for a general definition applied throughout the Act.146 No
support was provided for this contention, which was dropped inside a footnote.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2170–72.
136. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2170.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2170–71.
141. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2171.
142. The Latin phrase is translated as meaning “of the same kind.” Sports Graphics, Inc. v.
United States, 24 F.3d 1390, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
143. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2171.
144. Id.
145. Id. The dissent found no need for such an industry-specific approach, saying it was
“wrong to assume” that “there is in nearly every industry an outside salesman lurking somewhere
(if only we can find him).” Id. at 2179 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 2172 n.21 (majority opinion).
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This broader definition for “other dispositions” was enough for the majority to
find PSRs made “sales” and qualified for the outside salesman exemption.147
In reaching its conclusion, the majority noted that PSRs “bear all of the
external indicia” of salespeople, such as being hired for their sales experience,
working away from the office, and being compensated with significant
incentive pay.148 The majority said their decision also better met the purpose of
the Act’s exemption, given Reps’ significant compensation, and that it made
no sense to exclude PSRs based on a technicality specific to their industry.149
The conservative majority even acknowledged a pragmatic view, explaining
that “it would be challenging, to say the least, for pharmaceutical companies to
compensate detailers for overtime going forward without significantly
changing the nature of that position.”150
3.

The Liberal Justices’ Dissent

The dissent agreed that the Department’s interpretation of its regulations,
advanced by the Solicitor General during oral argument, should not be given
favorable weight.151 When the dissenters interpreted the provisions, though,
they found the Reps’ primary duty was not “making sales,” so Reps should
receive overtime pay.152 The detailer may convince a doctor to prescribe a drug
for certain types of patients, but in the end, the pharmacist is the one who sells
the drug.153
The dissent looked at the specific language of the statute and noted that the
Reps do not “sell,” “exchange,” or even “dispose” of the product to doctors.154
Instead detailers inform doctors about the drugs and explain their uses and
limitations.155 At most, the doctor may give the Rep a non-binding
commitment to prescribe the drugs where appropriate, and the patient then may
take the doctor’s prescription and use it to buy that drug.156 The dissent
highlighted two relevant pieces of data about this process: (1) thirty percent of
patients over a two-year period had not filled a prescription they received from
a doctor,157 and (2) seventy-five percent of prescriptions that are filled are done

147. Id. at 2172.
148. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2172–73.
149. Id. at 2172 n.23.
150. Id. at 2173.
151. Id. at 2175 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 2175–76 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
153. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2176.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. (citing The Public on Prescription Drugs and Pharmaceutical Companies, HARVARD
SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH ET AL. 3 (2008), http:// www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/7748.pdf).
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with generic drugs, not brand-name drugs.158 In other words, even when a Rep
is successful at the doctor’s office, that performance does not come close to
guaranteeing a sale of the promoted drug. A commitment to advise a client to
buy a product is not the same as a commitment to sell a product.159
Given this view of the process, the dissent found no difficulty in describing
the Reps’ work as promotional work, not sales. The dissent mentioned three
sources supporting this view: (1) the PhRMA Code, (2) a 1940 Department of
Labor report, and (3) a Wage and Hour Division report from 1949.160 The
Code emphasized that Reps deliver information to doctors, who remain totally
free to rely solely on their medical judgment to meet patients’ needs.161 Thus,
the industry itself recognized that a Rep’s primary duty could not be to make
nonbinding commitments, since these commitments would be irrelevant when
it came time to prescribe treatment for a patient.162 If Drug D was the best
option, the dissent said, that is what the doctor would prescribe regardless of
any commitments made.163 The 1940 report noted: (1) Detailers “‘pav[e] the
way’ for sales by others,” (2) “‘[t]hey do not make actual sales,’” and (3) “they
‘‘are admittedly not outside salesmen.’’”164 The 1949 report clarified the
distinction between promotion and sales and suggested the question in close
cases was whether the salesman is “actually engaged in activities directed
toward the consummation of his own sales, at least to the extent of obtaining a
commitment to buy from the person to whom he is selling.”165 Reps can
neither consummate their own sales nor receive a commitment to buy from
doctors. The dissent found these points more compelling than the majority’s
argument for an industry-specific exception, concluding that
[g]iven the fact that the doctor buys nothing, the fact that the detailer sells
nothing to the doctor, and the fact that any “nonbinding commitment” by the
doctor must, of ethical necessity, be of secondary importance, there is nothing

158. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2176 (citing U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
OFFICE OF SCIENCE & DATA POLICY, EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERIC DRUGS 2 (2010)).
159. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2177.
160. Id. at 2177–78.
161. Id. at 2177 (citing PHRMA, Code on Interactions with Healthcare Professionals 2
(2008), available at http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/108/phrma_marketing_code_
2008pdf).
162. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2177.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2178 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR DIV., REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDING OFFICER AT HEARINGS PRELIMINARY TO REDEFINITION
46 (1940)).
165. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2178 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR DIV.,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON PROPOSED REVISIONS OF REGULATIONS, PART 541, at 83
(1949)).
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about the detailer’s visit with the doctor that makes the visit (or what occurs
166
during the visit) “tantamount . . . to a paradigmatic sale.”

The weakest part of the dissent is the final paragraph, which addresses the
majority’s claim that treating Reps as outside salesmen fits with the purpose of
the Act’s exemptions. Here, the dissenters muster only a brief positivist
argument (although they likely would not identify it as such) that detailers
simply do not fall within the regulation’s definitions.167 The dissent avoids
trying to support the premise that the exemption should help well-paid Reps
get paid even better.
II. ANALYSIS
A.

The Agency’s Interpretation Was Not Entitled to Deference

The statutory definition of “sale”—any sale, exchange, contract to sell,
consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition—is ambiguous
when applied to the pharmaceutical sales setting.168 It does not plainly identify
whether a Rep’s attempt to sell doctors on prescribing certain drugs—an
activity that includes the disposition of product information and samples
potentially in exchange for a non-binding commitment—constitutes a “sale.”
Because of this ambiguity, the court can look at the agency’s interpretation for
guidance.169 Under its power to “define and delimit” the Act’s terms, the
Secretary attempted to further define “sale” through a published regulation,170
and the agency’s interpretation of that regulation would be entitled to
deference so long as it was not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.”171 The interpretation also needed to show the agency using its
expertise, not simply repeating the statutory language.172
At first glance, little distinguishes the definition provided in the second
sentence of the regulation from the statute.173 In fact, the Secretary’s definition
explains that “[s]ection 3(k) of the Act states.”174 Not only does that portion of
the regulation mirror the statutory language, but it expressly notes that it is

166. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2179 (citation omitted).
167. See id. at 2179–80.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 14–19.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 69–73.
170. 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b) (2011).
171. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
172. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006).
173. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b) (“Section 3(k) of the Act states that ‘sale’ or ‘sell’
includes any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other
disposition.”), with 29 U.S.C. § 203(k) (“‘Sale’ or ‘sell’ includes any sale, exchange, contract to
sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition.”).
174. 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b) (emphasis added).
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doing just that: repeating the statute’s language.175 It would not be difficult to
argue that, like in Gonzalez, the regulation simply “parrots” the statute.176 But
it is an unnecessary argument. Reliance on Auer is sufficient, since an agency’s
interpretation of its regulation is not entitled to deference when it is
inconsistent with the regulation.
Although the “transfer of title” language does differentiate the regulation
from the statute, it does so in a way that contradicts the statute. As Justice Alito
explained, a regulation that requires a transfer of title in order to recognize a
sale cannot be consistent with a statute that explicitly states that consignments
for sale are considered sales.177 A consignment for sale involves no transfer of
title from the consignee to the consignor; the title is transferred only to the
eventual buyer. When considering this point in conjunction with the practical
implications of granting deference in this instance,178 the Court had no problem
finding the DOL interpretation “plainly lack[ed] the hallmarks of thorough
consideration” and declined to provide Auer deference.179
B.

PSRs Do Not Fall Plainly and Unmistakably Within the Exemption’s
Terms

The Ninth Circuit emphasized a “common-sense understanding” to find
that PSRs make sales “in some sense.”180 The Supreme Court’s majority used a
similar approach, calling for a “functional” interpretation of the statute’s
terms.181 After all, both the employer and employee frequently refer to PSRs’

175. Id. As the Ninth Circuit noted, this definition, in effect, explains that “a ‘sale’ means a
‘sale.’” Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 394 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 132
S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
176. Of course, the opposing side would argue that someone interpreting the regulation
cannot simply gloss over its first sentence, which explains that “sales” include a “transfer of title
to tangible property, and in certain cases, of tangible and valuable evidences of intangible
property.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b). The two sentences cannot and should not be read separately,
but instead as one unit. See YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 2 (2008) (setting forth as a
cardinal rule of construction the requirement to read a statute as a harmonious whole). The
“transfer” language is completely unique to this interpretation and should not be discarded; it
provides a meaningful limitation on what can be considered a sale. In fact, the Second Circuit
found it “clear” that the inclusion of the “transfer of title” section, as well as the portion defining
and delimiting “outside salesman” in relation to promoting products, did “far more than merely
parrot” the FLSA’s language. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141, 153 (2d Cir.
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1568 (2011).
177. See supra text accompanying notes 131–136.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 127–130.
179. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2169 (2012).
180. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 395–97 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d,
132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
181. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2170.
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activity as “sales.”182 The Reps’ job title alone shows some acknowledgment
that their work could constitute sales; Glaxo was not being sued by
pharmaceutical “promotions” representatives.183 As the Ninth Circuit
explained:
Plaintiffs suggest that despite being hired for their sales experience, being
trained in sales methods, encouraging physicians to prescribe their products,
and receiving commission-based compensation tied to sales, their job cannot
“in some sense” be called selling. This view ignores the reality of the nature of
184
the work of detailers, as it has been carried out for decades.

If Congress had wanted a strict definition of sales, the argument goes, it would
not have included the rest of the terms in the statutory definition.185 A strict
reading would make those other terms superfluous, a result that should be
avoided since courts are asked to “give effect, if possible, to every clause and
word of a statute.”186
However, using a strict construction hardly makes the verbiage
superfluous. The Second Circuit suggested another canon of statutory
interpretation, ejusdem generis, which provides a competing view.187 Under
this rule, “where general words follow an enumeration of specific items, the
general words are read as applying only to other items akin to those
specifically enumerated.”188 Thus, “other dispositions” should not be read as a
broad catchall, but limited by the preceding terms, which all refer to a type of
sale. This interpretive approach also better follows the call to narrowly
construe the Act’s exemptions, another rule of statutory interpretation.189 This
approach is further validated by examining the common definition of the term
“disposition.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines it as “the act of transferring
something to another’s care or possession, esp. by deed or will; the
relinquishing of property.”190 Merriam-Webster’s provides a similar definition
182. See, e.g., Kuzinski v. Schering Corp., 604 F. Supp. 2d 385, 390–91 (D. Conn. 2009)
(noting that the term “sales” permeates descriptions of PSR work by both drug companies and
their employees and further finding the plaintiff himself admitted he considered his work
“selling”).
183. Nevertheless, some writers prefer to describe PSR activities as “ethical promotion.” See,
e.g., Robert F. Wright & William J. Lundstrom, Physicians’ Perceptions of Pharmaceutical Sales
Representatives: A Model for Analysing the Customer Relationship, 4 INT’L J. OF MED.
MARKETING 29, 34 (2004). Further, the statute pays no attention to job titles. 29 C.F.R. § 541.2
(“A job title alone is insufficient to establish the exempt status of an employee.”).
184. Christopher, 635 F.3d at 396.
185. See KIM, supra note 176, at 12–13.
186. Id. (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883)).
187. See KIM, supra note 176, at 10.
188. Id. (quoting Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 588 (1980)).
189. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141, 153 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 1568 (2011).
190. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 539 (9th ed. 2009).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2013]

NOT MAKING SALES PAID TOO WELL FOR PHARMACEUTICAL REPS

1041

for the term “dispose”: “to transfer or give away.”191 Even if a doctor’s nonbinding commitment to prescribe drugs is a “meaningful exchange,”192 it is
difficult to see how this exchange fits within those provided dictionary
definitions.
Despite agreeing that ejusdem generis should guide its interpretation of the
statute, the Court’s majority reached a different result, claiming the DOL’s
suggested application of the canon was too narrow.193 The majority argued that
Congress intended to broadly define “sale,” so “other dispositions” should be
treated similarly.194 The opinion further explained that ejusdem generis should
not be used to “obscure and defeat the intent and purpose of Congress.”195 Two
things are striking about this reasoning. First, the Court essentially states that
“other dispositions” is self-defining; Congress purportedly included it in the
definition of sales in order to create a broader definition, and thus, “other
dispositions” should also be broadly defined. This argument seems circular.
More troubling, the assertion that what the majority terms a “narrow”
construction of “other disposition” would defeat Congress’s intent completely
ignores the Court’s treatment of exemptions in remedial legislation—such
treatment claims that narrow constructions of exemptions are required in these
instances to effectuate the legislation’s purpose.196 This contradiction is not a
problem only for this specific case. The majority’s disregard of a narrow
construction of the exemption calls into question the continued relevance of
Arnold and the Court’s likely approach to future FLSA exemption
challenges.197 It creates the potential for more employer-friendly results.
Whether one tends to side with employers or employees on these disputes is
irrelevant; the problem is the Court seems to be overriding Congress’s intent,
or at least the way it has defined Congress’s intent in the FLSA realm for the
past half-century.
C. What About the Exemption’s Spirit?
Nevertheless, the dissent’s conclusion—that Reps are entitled to overtime
pay—would also have created an unsatisfying result. Although it would have
stayed faithful to the statutory language, it would have overlooked the FLSA’s

191. WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 568 (2d ed. 2003).
192. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 396 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 132
S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
193. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2171 (2012).
194. Id.
195. Id. (quoting United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680, 682 (1950)).
196. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
197. See David S. Rosenthal & Jeffery Gilbreth, High Court’s FLSA Ruling on Rx Reps: The
Ray of Hope It Offers Others, 323 FAIR LAB. STANDARDS HANDBOOK FOR STATES, LOC. GOV’T
& SCH. NEWSL. 5 (Aug. 2012), available at http://prod-admin1.tmg.atex.cniweb.net:8080/file
server/file/1751/filename/fair2012-08.pdf.
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social purpose.198 Finding PSRs not exempt would have created mixed results,
at best, in terms of satisfying the Act’s policy: protecting workers “unable to
protect themselves from excessively low wages and excessively long hours”
and spreading jobs to the jobless.199
1.

“Excessively Low Wages”

PSRs are already handsomely rewarded for their work through salaries that
commonly reach six figures when bonuses are counted.200 The high-salary
exemptions included in the Secretary’s regulations demonstrate the intent not
to overly reward employees who already receive significant compensation.201
Of course, the regulations do exclude outside sales people from the salary
requirements, so maybe the Secretary would not mind the resulting high pay
for Reps. This distinction between exemptions may have created the potential
for significant inconsistencies in the application, though. Some of the betterpaid Reps would fall into the highly compensated exemption as long as the
employer could show they met at least one portion of any of the other overtime
exemptions.202 Those employees would not receive overtime pay. Yet, their
counterparts who fell below the $100,000 mark would not receive that same
exemption, enabling them to earn overtime pay that could allow them to outearn their “highly compensated” coworkers.203
Besides, if the Act was meant to protect workers who could not protect
themselves from low wages, allowing the law to benefit workers who make

198. Nicholson v. World Bus. Network, Inc., 105 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 1997) (“To read
the FLSA blindly, without appreciation for the social goals Congress sought, would also do
violence to the FLSA’s spirit.”).
199. LINDER, supra note 18, at 48; see also supra notes 33–37, 41–45 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text. But see Baum v. AstraZeneca LP, 372 F.
App’x 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 332 (2010) (finding PSRs exempt from
the FLSA’s overtime provisions even in cases where the plaintiff worked up to 70 hours per week
and made as little as $63,000 in base salary).
201. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
202. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.601(a).
203. Further highlighting the ridiculousness of this inconsistency is the fact that once a nonexempt employee receives enough overtime pay within a fifty-two-week period to push the past
year’s compensation above $100,000, then that employee could be classified with his highly
compensated peers who are exempt from overtime. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.601(b)(2). That
designation might be fleeting, though. If the employee, no longer earning overtime pay, dips back
below $100,000 for the previous fifty-two-week period, that person no longer would fit through
the highly compensated loophole, which makes the employee non-exempt and eligible for
overtime pay again. See id.
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nearly twice as much as the average American household seems counter to the
Act’s purpose.204 Reps do not need overtime pay to help protect them.
2.

“Excessively Long Hours” and Job-Spreadings

Low wages are not a concern, but PSRs do contend with long hours. The
white-collar exemptions are partially based on the belief that these employees’
duties are difficult to spread, so forcing employers to pay overtime would not
help create jobs.205 Although a drug-maker could always shrink a Rep’s sales
territory and hire more employees to cover parts of the Rep’s former area,
territory size is not what leads Reps to work overtime. They work those hours
because their job requires them to attend dinners where they can more
successfully engage with doctors outside the hospital or office setting.206
Shrinking a Rep’s territory would have no effect on the necessity of them
attending these events. Still, if a Rep’s time at these evening events is
counterbalanced by fewer work hours during the day, there might be a need for
more Reps to handle the missed daytime assignments. Under this view, making
Reps eligible for overtime might make some sense for the purpose of spreading
employment.
From a practical standpoint, though, any talk about potential job spreading
in the industry must face the reality that drugmakers are more likely these days
to find other methods to promote their drugs.207 The irony in the application of
this “remedial” legislation is that, rather than benefitting the workers, finding
PSRs deserve overtime pay actually would have further destabilized their
already tenuous position. It would threaten additional job losses and other
worker-unfriendly industry changes.208 Further, ex-employees, as opposed to
current workers, have little to lose from suing their former employer.209 Thus,
the contraction of the market potentially would create a cyclical effect of
continued industry downsizing. Companies, focused on the bottom line, lay off
PSRs, who then sue the company for unpaid overtime. The company, forced to
pay tens or even hundreds of millions in unpaid overtime claims, then seeks
ways to improve the bottom line, which likely involves eliminating more sales
representatives. In the end, a statute aimed at helping employees actually helps

204. The median annual household income in the United States was $49,445 in 2011. Income,
Poverty and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, (Sept.
13, 2011), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/income_wealth/cb11-157.html.
205. See supra note 46; see also Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions, 69 Fed. Reg. at
22,124.
206. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.
208. See infra Part III.C.
209. See supra note 13.
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former employees while putting current employees at risk.210 That result totally
contradicts the Act’s spirit.
III. NON-JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS
The Court’s decision in Christopher provides much-needed clarity for the
pharmaceutical industry, as well as serving as strong guidance for similarly
regulated industries, such as the medical device field. However, the majority
opinion creates new questions for the future, such as the proper construction of
other FLSA exemptions. What other definitions could be considered general
ones in order to avoid Arnold’s call for narrow construction? In addition, the
result hardly weds the terms and spirit of the outside sales exemption in this
context. The ideal solution here likely resided outside the judicial branch.
A.

The Secretary Could Have Expanded the Definition of Sale

Congress specifically chose the Secretary to fill any gaps related to the
Act’s exemptions,211 and the DOL is better positioned to fill those gaps than
the Court.212 The Secretary could have given it another shot and more
accurately defined what constitutes a “sale” or an “outside salesperson” in the
pharmaceutical context.213 At least one author has suggested massively
changing the definition to create a special exclusion for PSRs.214
The problem is that the Secretary’s interpretation, as argued in the
Department’s amicus brief, was no better than the Second Circuit’s outcome:
Reps would get overtime. It is unclear why the Secretary would suddenly
decide to support finding PSRs exempt. If the Department merely wanted to
have the courts interpret the Act consistently with the express language, a
revised definition could have been a workable option. However, that solution
likely ignores the political and policy undercurrents of finding Reps eligible for
overtime. Remember, the FLSA was passed at a time of high unemployment as
a way to force companies to spread work and create more jobs.215 Today, at a
time when the nation’s unemployment rate has remained above seven percent
since December 2008, the administration might desire a return to a more
forceful execution of the FLSA as an attempt to help get more people

210. Id.
211. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1); see also supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
212. See Daniel Lovejoy, The Ambiguous Basis for Chevron Deference: Multiple-Agency
Statutes, 88 VA. L. REV. 879, 888 (2002).
213. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).
214. Bryan D. Sullivan, Reconciling the Terms and Spirit of the Law: Pharmaceutical Sales
Representatives and the FLSA Outside-Sales Exemption, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1429, 1447 (2011).
215. Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 577–78 (1942).
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working.216 Of course, this reasoning ignores the climate of the industry;
pharmaceutical companies would be more likely to respond by cutting jobs
than by adding them.217
B.

Congress Could Have Amended the Act

The Novartis court, likely not fully pleased with the end result of its
analysis, explicitly mentioned the legislative option: “To the extent that the
pharmaceuticals industry wishes to have the concept of ‘sales’ expanded . . . it
should direct its efforts to Congress, not the courts.”218 Congress has already
amended the Act dozens of times; for instance, any increase in the national
minimum wage requires amending the FLSA.219 One such amendment, in
1990, added computer systems analysts, computer programmers, and software
engineers as exempt employees.220 The benefit of this type of fix is that it
would have completely avoided the problem of trying to classify PSRs within
the current exemptions; a new one designed specifically for them could have
been created.
C. Or the Pharmaceutical Industry Could Have Adapted
Even without judicial clarification, drugmakers could have responded by
altering Reps’ job requirements and expectations to ensure they would not be
eligible for overtime regardless of their designation.221 These changes would
have required an increased amount of oversight, possibly to an extent that

216. Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, (Oct. 5, 2012), http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000.
217. See supra notes 4–12 and accompanying text.
218. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141, 155 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 1568 (2011); see also KIM, supra note 176, at 2 (“[T]he Court recognizes that legislative
power resides in Congress, and that Congress can legislate away interpretations with which it
disagrees.”).
219. See, e.g., Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–28 § 8102, 121 Stat 112
(2007).
220. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(17).
221. This transformation has already begun as part of the overall restructuring of the industry.
See, e.g., The Evolution of Pharmaceutical Sales: New Models for a Changing Environment, IMS
HEALTH (February 2008), http://www.imshealth.com/deployedfiles/imshealth/Global/Content/
Document/Sales%20and%20Marketing%20Effectiveness%20TL/Evolution_PharmaSales_new_
models_changing_environment_PEE.pdf. Potential industry changes could include smaller
territories to decrease employee travel time during the day and stricter oversight of employees’
time. See Mike Wokasch, New Work Rules for Pharmaceutical Representatives, PHARMA
REFORM, (July 27, 2011), http://www.pharmareform.com/2011/07/27/new-work-rules-for-phar
maceutical-sales-representatives. This new oversight likely would involve “punching a clock” in
order to account for time worked, as well as time spent for personal use, breaks, or lunch. Id.
Some employers might go so far as to install GPS systems in employee’s cars in order to track
them throughout the day. Id.
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employees would consider it micromanaging.222 Altered duties could also help
employers make the case that even if Reps are not outside salesmen, they fit
another FLSA exemption, such as the one for administrative employees.
Numerous courts had shown a willingness to embrace that argument for
PSRs.223 Further, thanks to the exemption for highly compensated workers, a
minor tweak would be enough for some employees to be found exempt. The
downside, of course, is that companies seek clarity, not continued litigation,
which is what they would have faced even if they changed worker
responsibilities enough to merit applying another exemption.
An hourly employee who works sixty hours in a week, which is not
uncommon in this field, would have earned as much in overtime pay as in
regular weekly salary. Reps would have been unlikely to cash in, though.
Besides altering Reps’ work hours so that they do not receive overtime pay,
drugmakers also likely would have restructured how they compensate Reps.224
Companies might have cut base salaries or reduced, if not totally eliminated,
incentive-based compensation. Companies opting for the latter would no
longer have rewarded Reps for the quality of their work, but instead by the
quantity of hours they put into it. That change would have been a tough sell for
both employers and employees. Employers would have been reluctant to make
the change because the first one to do it likely would suffer a significant loss of
talent. After all, the most successful sellers are the ones who benefit the most
from incentive-based bonuses, and they might decide to join a competitor that
retained its incentive-based compensation structure. Ironically, employees
would take the biggest hit. Besides uncertainty about their pay moving
forward, Reps also might find themselves on the corporate chopping block.
Layoffs may have been a common answer for companies seeking to prevent a
further hit to the bottom line.225 Although the industry had a number of
potential responses, few of these potential changes would have been favorable
for employees.

222. Wokasch, supra note 221.
223. See, e.g., Baum v. AstraZeneca LP, 372 F. App’x 246, 248–50 (3d Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 332 (2010) (finding no need to address whether the plaintiff fell under the
outside salesperson exemption since the court had determined the administrative exemption was
applicable); Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming the trial
court’s decision that although the outside sales exemption did not apply, the administrative
exemption did). But see In re Novartis, 611 F.3d at 157 (finding the representatives did not
exhibit the necessary discretion and independent judgment to meet the administrative exemption);
Kuzinski v. Schering Corp., 801 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22, 30 (D. Conn. 2011) (where defendant
followed an unsuccessful motion for summary judgment based on the outside sales exemption
with a similarly unsuccessful motion based on the administrative exemption).
224. Scott, supra note 8.
225. Vanishing, supra note 4.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2013]

NOT MAKING SALES PAID TOO WELL FOR PHARMACEUTICAL REPS

1047

CONCLUSION
Federal law prohibits direct sales of prescription drugs to the users. Thus,
pharmaceutical sales representatives must settle for promoting the product to
physicians, who can prescribe it to patients, who may or may not purchase that
brand-name drug. This activity should not meet the definition of “making
sales” that the FLSA requires for an employee to be exempt from receiving
overtime pay, particularly if the Court had followed Arnold’s call for narrowly
construing FLSA exemptions. When the Court examined the statute’s text, it
should have found that PSRs are entitled to overtime compensation. That
result, though true to the terms of the FLSA’s outside sales exemption under
the usually applied narrow construction, would have run counter to the purpose
behind the overtime pay law and its exceptions. In addition, while some
employees—and mostly former employees—would have gained a windfall
from receiving back pay for unpaid overtime, that decision really would have
been a long-term loss for PSRs. If the Court had found Reps were entitled to
overtime, the Reps likely would have faced continued downsizing, altered job
requirements, and reduced guaranteed compensation. This issue presented
numerous alternative responses, with the best option being Congress revisiting
the FLSA to add an exemption exclusively for Reps. However, rather than
waiting for others to respond to the problem, the Court issued a pragmatic
decision that provides a reasonable result, even if the reasoning is not the
soundest. The most disturbing part for workers is the majority’s cold shoulder
for Arnold, potentially signifying a new approach to FLSA disputes that will be
much more favorable for employers.
ROBERT J. HURTT, JR.*

* I would like to thank everyone who helped contribute to the publication of this Note,
particularly Professor Matt Bodie for his guidance and suggestions. Thanks also to Danielle and
Vivienne Hurtt for all of their love and support throughout the writing (and rewriting) process.
And a final thanks to the Supreme Court for granting cert in Christopher; although that decision
led to significant revision of this Note, the final product is better for it.
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